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ABSTRACT
We deﬁne a new class of games, congestion games with load-
dependent failures (CGLFs), which generalizes the well-known
class of congestion games, by incorporating the issue of re-
source failures into congestion games. In a CGLF, agents
share a common set of resources, where each resource has a
cost and a probability of failure. Each agent chooses a sub-
set of the resources for the execution of his task, in order to
maximize his own utility. The utility of an agent is the dif-
ference between his beneﬁt from successful task completion
and the sum of the costs over the resources he uses. CGLFs
possess two novel features. It is the ﬁrst model to incor-
porate failures into congestion settings, which results in a
strict generalization of congestion games. In addition, it is
the ﬁrst model to consider load-dependent failures in such
framework, where the failure probability of each resource
depends on the number of agents selecting this resource.
Although, as we show, CGLFs do not admit a potential
function, and in general do not have a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium, our main theorem proves the existence of a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with identical re-
sources and nondecreasing cost functions.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed
Systems; I.2.11 [Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Distributed Ar-
tiﬁcial Intelligence —multiagent systems
General Terms
Theory, Economics
Keywords
Congestion games, Load-dependent resource failures, Pure
strategy Nash equilibrium
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1. INTRODUCTION
We study the e ects of resource failures in congestion set-
tings. This study is motivated by a variety of situations
in multi-agent systems with unreliable components, such as
machines, computers etc. We deﬁne a model for congestion
games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs) which provides
simple and natural description of such situations. In this
model, we are given a ﬁnite set of identical resources (service
providers) where each element possesses a failure probabil-
ity describing the probability of unsuccessful completion of
its assigned tasks as a (nondecreasing) function of its con-
gestion. There is a ﬁxed number of agents, each having
a task which can be carried out by any of the resources.
For reliability reasons, each agent may decide to assign his
task, simultaneously, to a number of resources. Thus, the
congestion on the resources is not known in advance, but
is strategy-dependent. Each resource is associated with a
cost, which is a (nonnegative) function of the congestion ex-
perienced by this resource. The objective of each agent is to
maximize his own utility, which is the di erence between his
beneﬁt from successful task completion and the sum of the
costs over the set of resources he uses. The beneﬁts of the
agents from successful completion of their tasks are allowed
to vary across the agents.
The resource cost function describes the cost su ered by
an agent for selecting that resource, as a function of the
number of agents who have selected it. Thus, it is natural
to assume that these functions are nonnegative. In addition,
in many real-life applications of our model the resource cost
functions have a special structure. In particular, they can
monotonically increase or decrease with the number of the
users, depending on the context. The former case is mo-
tivated by situations where high congestion on a resource
causes longer delay in its assigned tasks execution and as
a result, the cost of utilizing this resource might be higher.
A typical example of such situation is as follows. Assume
we need to deliver an important package. Since there is no
guarantee that a courier will reach the destination in time,
we might send several couriers to deliver the same package.
The time required by each courier to deliver the package
increases with the congestion on his way. In addition, the
payment to a courier is proportional to the time he spends
in delivering the package. Thus, the payment to the courier
increases when the congestion increases. The latter case (de-
creasing cost functions) describes situations where a group
of agents using a particular resource have an opportunity to
share its cost among the group’s members, or, the cost ofusing a resource decreases with the number of users, accord-
ing to some marketing policy.
Our results
  We show that CGLFs and, in particular, CGLFs with
nondecreasing cost functions, do not admit a poten-
tial function. Therefore, the CGLF model can not be
reduced to congestion games. Nevertheless, if the fail-
ure probabilities are constant (do not depend on the
congestion) then a potential function is guaranteed to
exist.
  We show that CGLFs and, in particular, CGLFs with
decreasing cost functions, do not possess pure strat-
egy Nash equilibria. However, as we show in our main
result, there exists a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium in any CGLF with nondecreasing cost
functions.
Related work
Our model extends the well-known class of congestion games
[11]. In a congestion game, every agent has to choose from a
ﬁnite set of resources, where the utility (or cost) of an agent
from using a particular resource depends on the number of
agents using it, and his total utility (cost) is the sum of
the utilities (costs) obtained from the resources he uses. An
important property of these games is the existence of pure
strategy Nash equilibria. Monderer and Shapley [9] intro-
duced the notions of potential function and potential game
and proved that the existence of a potential function implies
the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. They
observed that Rosenthal [11] proved his theorem on con-
gestion games by constructing a potential function (hence,
every congestion game is a potential game). Moreover, they
showed that every ﬁnite potential game is isomorphic to a
congestion game; hence, the classes of ﬁnite potential games
and congestion games coincide.
Congestion games have been extensively studied and gen-
eralized. In particular, Leyton-Brown and Tennenholtz [5]
extended the class of congestion games to the class of local-
e ect games. In a local-e ect game, each agent’s payo  is
e ected not only by the number of agents who have chosen
the same resources as he has chosen, but also by the number
of agents who have chosen neighboring resources (in a given
graph structure). Monderer [8] dealt with another type of
generalization of congestion games, in which the resource
cost functions are player-speciﬁc (PS-congestion games). He
deﬁned PS-congestion games of type q (q-congestion games),
where q is a positive number, and showed that every game
in strategic form is a q-congestion game for some q. Player-
speciﬁc resource cost functions were discussed for the ﬁrst
time by Milchtaich [6]. He showed that simple and strategy-
symmetric PS-congestion games are not potential games,
but always possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. PS-
congestion games were generalized to weighted congestion
games [6] (or, ID-congestion games [7]), in which the re-
source cost functions are not only player-speciﬁc, but also
depend on the identity of the users of the resource. Ack-
ermann et al. [1] showed that weighted congestion games
admit pure strategy Nash equilibria if the strategy space of
each player consists of the bases of a matroid on the set of
resources.
Much of the work on congestion games has been inspired
by the fact that every such game has a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. In particular, Fabrikant et al. [3] studied
the computational complexity of ﬁnding pure strategy Nash
equilibria in congestion games. Intensive study has also
been devoted to quantify the ine ciency of equilibria in
congestion games. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [4] pro-
posed the worst-case ratio of the social welfare achieved
by a Nash equilibrium and by a socially optimal strategy
proﬁle (dubbed the price of anarchy) as a measure of the
performance degradation caused by lack of coordination.
Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [2] considered the price of
anarchy of pure equilibria in congestion games with linear
cost functions. Roughgarden and Tardos [12] used this ap-
proach to study the cost of selﬁsh routing in networks with
a continuum of users.
However, the above settings do not take into considera-
tion the possibility that resources may fail to execute their
assigned tasks. In the computer science context of conges-
tion games, where the alternatives of concern are machines,
computers, communication lines etc., which are obviously
prone to failures, this issue should not be ignored.
Penn, Polukarov and Tennenholtz were the ﬁrst to in-
corporate the issue of failures into congestion settings [10].
They introduced a class of congestion games with failures
(CGFs) and proved that these games, while not being iso-
morphic to congestion games, always possess Nash equilibria
in pure strategies. The CGF-model signiﬁcantly di ers from
ours. In a CGF, the authors considered the delay associated
with successful task completion, where the delay for an agent
is the minimum of the delays of his successful attempts and
the aim of each agent is to minimize his expected delay. In
contrast with the CGF-model, in our model we consider the
total cost of the utilized resources, where each agent wishes
to maximize the di erence between his beneﬁt from a suc-
cessful task completion and the sum of his costs over the
resources he uses.
The above di erences imply that CGFs and CGLFs pos-
sess di erent properties. In particular, if in our model the
resource failure probabilities were constant and known in ad-
vance, then a potential function would exist. This, however,
does not hold for CGFs; in CGFs, the failure probabilities
are constant but there is no potential function. Further-
more, the procedures proposed by the authors in [10] for
the construction of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium are
not valid in our model, even in the simple, agent-symmetric
case, where all agents have the same beneﬁt from successful
completion of their tasks.
Our work provides the ﬁrst model of congestion settings
with resource failures, which considers the sum of congestion-
dependent costs over utilized resources, and therefore, does
not extend the CGF-model, but rather generalizes the classic
model of congestion games. Moreover, it is the ﬁrst model
to consider load-dependent failures in the above context.Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we deﬁne our model. In Section 3 we present our results.
In 3.1 we show that CGLFs, in general, do not have pure
strategy Nash equilibria. In 3.2 we focus on CGLFs with
nondecreasing cost functions (nondecreasing CGLFs). We
show that these games do not admit a potential function.
However, in our main result we show the existence of pure
strategy Nash equilibria in nondecreasing CGLFs. Section
4 is devoted to a short discussion. Many of the proofs are
omitted from this conference version of the paper, and will
appear in the full version.
2. THE MODEL
The scenarios considered in this work consist of a ﬁnite set
of agents where each agent has a task that can be carried
out by any element of a set of identical resources (service
providers). The agents simultaneously choose a subset of
the resources in order to perform their tasks, and their aim
is to maximize their own expected payo , as described in
the sequel.
Let N be a set of n agents (n   N), and let M be a set
of m resources (m   N). Agent i   N chooses a strat-
egy  i    i which is a (potentially empty) subset of the
resources. That is,  i is the power set of the set of re-
sources:  i = P(M). Given a subset S   N of the agents,
the set of strategy combinations of the members of S is
denoted by  S =  i S i, and the set of strategy combi-
nations of the complement subset of agents is denoted by
  S (  S =  N S =  i N S i). The set of pure strategy
proﬁles of all the agents is denoted by   (  =  N).
Each resource is associated with a cost, c(·), and a fail-
ure probability, f(·), each of which depends on the num-
ber of agents who use this resource. We assume that the
failure probabilities of the resources are independent. Let
  = ( 1,..., n)     be a pure strategy proﬁle. The
(m-dimensional) congestion vector that corresponds to   is
h
  = (h
 
e)e M, where h
 
e =
˛
˛{i   N : e    i}
˛
˛. The fail-
ure probability of a resource e is a monotone nondecreasing
function f : {1,...,n}   [0,1) of the congestion experi-
enced by e. The cost of utilizing resource e is a function
c : {1,...,n}   R+ of the congestion experienced by e.
The outcome for agent i   N is denoted by xi   {S,F},
where S and F, respectively, indicate whether the task ex-
ecution succeeded or failed. We say that the execution of
agent’s i task succeeds if the task of agent i is successfully
completed by at least one of the resources chosen by him.
The beneﬁt of agent i from his outcome xi is denoted by
Vi(xi), where Vi(S) = vi, a given (nonnegative) value, and
Vi(F) = 0.
The utility of agent i from strategy proﬁle   and his out-
come xi, ui( ,xi), is the di erence between his beneﬁt from
the outcome (Vi(xi)) and the sum of the costs of the re-
sources he has used:
ui( ,xi) = Vi(xi)  
X
e  i
c(h
 
e).
The expected utility of agent i from strategy proﬁle  , Ui( ),
is, therefore:
Ui( ) =
 
1  
Y
e  i
f(h
 
e)
!
vi  
X
e  i
c(h
 
e),
where 1 
Q
e  i f(h
 
e) denotes the probability of successful
completion of agent i’s task. We use the convention that Q
e   f(h
 
e) = 1. Hence, if agent i chooses an empty set
 i =   (does not assign his task to any resource), then his
expected utility, Ui( ,  i), equals zero.
3. PURE STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA
IN CGLFS
In this section we present our results on CGLFs. We inves-
tigate the property of the (non-)existence of pure strategy
Nash equilibria in these games. We show that this class of
games does not, in general, possess pure strategy equilibria.
Nevertheless, if the resource cost functions are nondecreas-
ing then such equilibria are guaranteed to exist, despite the
non-existence of a potential function.
3.1 Decreasing Cost Functions
We start by showing that the class of CGLFs and, in par-
ticular, the subclass of CGLFs with decreasing cost func-
tions, does not, in general, possess Nash equilibria in pure
strategies.
Consider a CGLF with two agents (N = {1,2}) and two
resources (M = {e1,e2}). The cost function of each resource
is given by c(x) =
1
xx, where x   {1,2}, and the failure
probabilities are f(1) = 0.01 and f(2) = 0.26. The beneﬁts
of the agents from successful task completion are v1 = 1.1
and v2 = 4. Below we present the payo  matrix of the game.
  {e1} {e2} {e1,e2}
  U1 = 0 U1 = 0 U1 = 0 U1 = 0
U2 = 0 U2 = 2.96 U2 = 2.96 U2 = 1.9996
{e1} U1 = 0.089 U1 = 0.564 U1 = 0.089 U1 = 0.564
U2 = 0 U2 = 2.71 U2 = 2.96 U2 = 2.7396
{e2} U1 = 0.089 U1 = 0.089 U1 = 0.564 U1 = 0.564
U2 = 0 U2 = 2.96 U2 = 2.71 U2 = 2.7396
{e1,e2}U1 =  0.90011 U1 =  0.15286 U1 =  0.15286 U1 = 0.52564
U2 = 0 U2 = 2.71 U2 = 2.71 U2 = 3.2296
Table 1: Example for non-existence of pure strategy Nash
equilibria in CGLFs.
It can be easily seen that for every pure strategy proﬁle  
in this game there exist an agent i and a strategy  
 
i    i
such that Ui(  i, 
 
i) > Ui( ). That is, every pure strategy
proﬁle in this game is not in equilibrium.
However, if the cost functions in a given CGLF do not
decrease in the number of users, then, as we show in the
main result of this paper, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
is guaranteed to exist.3.2 Nondecreasing Cost Functions
This section focuses on the subclass of CGLFs with nonde-
creasing cost functions (henceforth, nondecreasing CGLFs).
We show that nondecreasing CGLFs do not, in general, ad-
mit a potential function. Therefore, these games are not
congestion games. Nevertheless, we prove that all such games
possess pure strategy Nash equilibria.
3.2.1 The (Non-)Existence of a Potential Function
Recall that Monderer and Shapley [9] introduced the no-
tions of potential function and potential game, where poten-
tial game is deﬁned to be a game that possesses a potential
function. A potential function is a real-valued function over
the set of pure strategy proﬁles, with the property that the
gain (or loss) of an agent shifting to another strategy while
the other agents’ strategies are kept unchanged, equals to
the corresponding increment of the potential function. The
authors [9] showed that the classes of ﬁnite potential games
and congestion games coincide.
Here we show that the class of CGLFs and, in particular,
the subclass of nondecreasing CGLFs, does not admit a po-
tential function, and therefore is not included in the class of
congestion games. However, for the special case of constant
failure probabilities, a potential function is guaranteed to
exist. To prove these statements we use the following char-
acterization of potential games [9].
A path in   is a sequence   = ( 
0    
1   ···) such
that for every k   1 there exists a unique agent, say agent
i, such that  
k = ( 
k 1
 i , 
 
i) for some  
 
i  =  
k 1
i in  i. A
ﬁnite path   = ( 
0    
1   ···    
K) is closed if  
0 =  
K.
It is a simple closed path if in addition  
l  =  
k for every
0   l  = k   K   1. The length of a simple closed path is
deﬁned to be the number of distinct points in it; that is, the
length of   = ( 
0    
1   ···    
K) is K.
Theorem 1. [9] Let G be a game in strategic form with
a vector U = (U1,...,Un) of utility functions. For a ﬁnite
path   = ( 
0    
1   ···    
K), let U( ) =
PK
k=1[Uik( 
k) 
Uik( 
k 1)], where ik is the unique deviator at step k. Then,
G is a potential game if and only if U( ) = 0 for every sim-
ple closed path   of length 4.
Load-Dependent Failures
Based on Theorem 1, we present the following counterex-
ample that demonstrates the non-existence of a potential
function in CGLFs.
We consider the following agent-symmetric game G in
which two agents (N = {1,2}) wish to assign a task to two
resources (M = {e1,e2}). The beneﬁt from a successful task
completion of each agent equals v, and the failure probabil-
ity function strictly increases with the congestion. Consider
the simple closed path of length 4 which is formed by
  = ( ,{e2}),   = ({e1},{e2}),
  = ({e1},{e1,e2}),   = ( ,{e1,e2}) :
{e2} {e1,e2}
  U1 = 0 U1 = 0
U2 = (1   f(1))v   c(1) U2 =
`
1   f(1)
2´
v   2c(1)
{e1} U1 = (1   f(1))v   c(1) U1 = (1   f(2))v   c(2)
U2 = (1   f(1))v   c(1) U2 = (1   f(1)f(2))v   c(1)   c(2)
Table 2: Example for non-existence of potentials in CGLFs.
Therefore,
U1( )   U1( ) + U2( )   U2( ) + U1( )   U1( )
+U2( )   U2( ) = v (1   f(1))(f(1)   f(2))  = 0.
Thus, by Theorem 1, nondecreasing CGLFs do not ad-
mit potentials. As a result, they are not congestion games.
However, as presented in the next section, the special case
in which the failure probabilities are constant, always pos-
sesses a potential function.
Constant Failure Probabilities
We show below that CGLFs with constant failure probabil-
ities always possess a potential function. This follows from
the fact that the expected beneﬁt (revenue) of each agent in
this case does not depend on the choices of the other agents.
In addition, for each agent, the sum of the costs over his cho-
sen subset of resources, equals the payo  of an agent choos-
ing the same strategy in the corresponding congestion game.
Assume we are given a game G with constant failure prob-
abilities. Let   = (                 ) be an arbitrary
simple closed path of length 4. Let i and j denote the active
agents (deviators) in   and z     {i,j} be a ﬁxed strat-
egy proﬁle of the other agents. Let   = (xi,xj,z),   =
(yi,xj,z),   = (yi,yj,z),   = (xi,yj,z), where xi,yi    i
and xj,yj    j. Then,
U( ) = Ui(xi,xj,z)   Ui(yi,xj,z)
+Uj(yi,xj,z)   Uj(yi,yj,z)
+Ui(yi,yj,z)   Ui(xi,yj,z)
+Uj(xi,yj,z)   Uj(xi,xj,z)
=
“
1   f
|xi|
”
vi  
X
e xi
c(h
(xi,xj,z)
e )   ...
 
“
1   f
|xj|
”
vj +
X
e xj
c(h
(xi,xj,z)
e )
=
»“
1   f
|xi|
”
vi   ...  
“
1   f
|xj|
”
vj
–
 
» X
e xi
c(h
(xi,xj,z)
e )   ...  
X
e xj
c(h
(xi,xj,z)
e )
–
.
Notice that
»“
1   f
|xi|
”
vi  ... 
“
1   f
|xj|
”
vj
–
= 0, as
a sum of a telescope series. The remaining sum equals 0, by
applying Theorem 1 to congestion games, which are known
to possess a potential function. Thus, by Theorem 1, G is a
potential game.We note that the above result holds also for the more
general settings with non-identical resources (having di er-
ent failure probabilities and cost functions) and general cost
functions (not necessarily monotone and/or nonnegative).
3.2.2 The Existence of a Pure Strategy Nash Equilib-
rium
In the previous section, we have shown that CGLFs and,
in particular, nondecreasing CGLFs, do not admit a poten-
tial function, but this fact, in general, does not contradict
the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies. In this
section, we present and prove the main result of this pa-
per (Theorem 2) which shows the existence of pure strategy
Nash equilibria in nondecreasing CGLFs.
Theorem 2. Every nondecreasing CGLF possesses a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies.
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on Lemmas 4, 7 and
8, which are presented in the sequel. We start with some
deﬁnitions and observations that are needed for their proofs.
In particular, we present the notions of A-, D- and S-stability
and show that a strategy proﬁle is in equilibrium if and only
if it is A-, D- and S- stable. Furthermore, we prove the
existence of such a proﬁle in any given nondecreasing CGLF.
Definition 3. For any strategy proﬁle       and for any
agent i   N, the operation of adding precisely one resource
to his strategy,  i, is called an A-move of i from  . Simi-
larly, the operation of dropping a single resource is called a
D-move, and the operation of switching one resource with
another is called an S-move.
Clearly, if agent i deviates from strategy  i to strategy  
 
i
by applying a single A-, D- or S-move, then max{| i    
 
i|,
| 
 
i    i|} = 1, and vice versa, if max{| i    
 
i|,| 
 
i    i|} =
1 then  
 
i is obtained from  i by applying exactly one such
move. For simplicity of exposition, for any pair of sets A
and B, let µ(A,B) = max{|A   B|,|B   A|}.
The following lemma implies that any strategy proﬁle, in
which no agent wishes unilaterally to apply a single A-, D-
or S-move, is a Nash equilibrium. More precisely, we show
that if there exists an agent who beneﬁts from a unilateral
deviation from a given strategy proﬁle, then there exists a
single A-, D- or S-move which is proﬁtable for him as well.
Lemma 4. Given a nondecreasing CGLF, let       be a
strategy proﬁle which is not in equilibrium, and let i   N
such that  xi    i for which Ui(  i,xi) > Ui( ). Then,
there exists yi    i such that Ui(  i,yi) > Ui( ) and µ(yi, i)
= 1.
Therefore, to prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium, it su ces to look for a strategy proﬁle for which
no agent wishes to unilaterally apply an A-, D- or S-move.
Based on the above observation, we deﬁne A-, D- and S-
stability as follows.
Definition 5. A strategy proﬁle   is said to be A-stable
(resp., D-stable, S-stable) if there are no agents with a
proﬁtable A- (resp., D-, S-) move from  . Similarly, we
deﬁne a strategy proﬁle   to be DS-stable if there are no
agents with a proﬁtable D- or S-move from  .
The set of all DS-stable strategy proﬁles is denoted by
 
0. Obviously, the proﬁle ( ,..., ) is DS-stable, so  
0
is not empty. Our goal is to ﬁnd a DS-stable proﬁle for
which no proﬁtable A-move exists, implying this proﬁle is
in equilibrium. To describe how we achieve this, we deﬁne
the notions of light (heavy) resources and (nearly-) even
strategy proﬁles, which play a central role in the proof of
our main result.
Definition 6. Given a strategy proﬁle  , resource e is
called  -light if h
 
e   argmine M h
 
e and  -heavy otherwise.
A strategy proﬁle   with no heavy resources will be termed
even. A strategy proﬁle   satisfying |h
 
e   h
 
e |   1 for all
e,e
    M will be termed nearly-even.
Obviously, every even strategy proﬁle is nearly-even. In
addition, in a nearly-even strategy proﬁle, all heavy resources
(if exist) have the same congestion. We also observe that the
proﬁle ( ,..., ) is even (and DS-stable), so the subset of
even, DS-stable strategy proﬁles is not empty.
Based on the above observations, we deﬁne two types of
an A-move that are used in the sequel. Suppose      
0
is a nearly-even DS-stable strategy proﬁle. For each agent
i   N, let ei   argmine M  i h
 
e. That is, ei is a light-
est resource not chosen previously by i. Then, if there ex-
ists any proﬁtable A-move for agent i, then the A-move
with ei is proﬁtable for i as well. This is since if agent i
wishes to unilaterally add a resource, say a   M    i, then
Ui (  i,( i   {a})) > Ui( ). Hence,
 
1  
Y
e  i
f(h
 
e)f(h
 
a + 1)
!
vi  
X
e  i
c(h
 
e)   c(h
 
a + 1)
>
 
1  
Y
e  i
f(h
 
e)
!
vi  
X
e  i
c(h
 
e)
  vi
Y
e  i
f(h
 
e) >
c(h
 
a + 1)
1   f(h 
a + 1)
 
c(h
 
ei + 1)
1   f(h 
ei + 1)
  Ui (  i,( i   {ei})) > Ui( ).
If no agent wishes to change his strategy in this man-
ner, i.e. Ui( )   Ui(  i, i {ei}) for all i   N, then by the
above Ui( )   Ui(  i, i {a}) for all i   N and a   M  i.
Hence,   is A-stable and by Lemma 4,   is a Nash equilib-
rium strategy proﬁle. Otherwise, let N( ) denote the subset
of all agents for which there exists ei such that a unilateral
addition of ei is proﬁtable. Let a   argminei : i N( ) h
 
ei. Let
also i   N( ) be the agent for which ei = a. If a is  -light,
then let  
  = (  i, i   {a}). In this case we say that  
  is
obtained from   by a one-step addition of resource a, and a
is called an added resource. If a is  -heavy then there exists
a  -light resource b and an agent j such that a    j and
b /    j. Then let  
  =
`
  {i,j}, i   {a},( j   {a})   {b}
´
.
In this case we say that  
  is obtained from   by a two-step
addition of resource b, and b is called an added resource.
We notice that, in both cases, the congestion of each re-
source in  
  is the same as in  , except for the added re-
source, for which its congestion in  
  increased by 1. Thus,
since the added resource is  -light and   is nearly-even,  
 
is nearly-even. Then, the following lemma implies the S-
stability of  
 .Lemma 7. In a nondecreasing CGLF, every nearly-even
strategy proﬁle is S-stable.
Coupled with Lemma 7, the following lemma shows that
if   is a nearly-even and DS-stable strategy proﬁle, and  
  is
obtained from   by a one- or two-step addition of resource
a, then the only potential cause for a non-DS-stability of  
 
is the existence of an agent k   N with  
 
k =  k, who wishes
to drop the added resource a.
Lemma 8. Let   be a nearly-even DS-stable strategy pro-
ﬁle of a given nondecreasing CGLF, and let  
  be obtained
from   by a one- or two-step addition of resource a. Then,
there are no proﬁtable D-moves for any agent i   N with
 
 
i  =  i. For an agent i   N with  
 
i =  i, the only possible
proﬁtable D-move (if exists) is to drop the added resource a.
We are now ready to prove our main result - Theorem
2. Let us brieﬂy describe the idea behind the proof. By
Lemma 4, it su ces to prove the existence of a strategy
proﬁle which is A-, D- and S-stable. We start with the set
of even and DS-stable strategy proﬁles which is obviously
not empty. In this set, we consider the subset of strategy
proﬁles with maximum congestion and maximum sum of the
agents’ utilities. Assuming on the contrary that every DS-
stable proﬁle admits a proﬁtable A-move, we show the exis-
tence of a strategy proﬁle x in the above subset, such that a
(one-step) addition of some resource a to x results in a DS-
stable strategy. Then by a ﬁnite series of one- or two-step
addition operations we obtain an even, DS-stable strategy
proﬁle with strictly higher congestion on the resources, con-
tradicting the choice of x. The full proof is presented below.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let  
1    
0 be the subset of
all even, DS-stable strategy proﬁles. Observe that since
( ,..., ) is an even, DS-stable strategy proﬁle, then  
1
is not empty, and min   0
˛
˛{e   M : e is   heavy}
˛
˛ = 0.
Then,  
1 could also be deﬁned as
 
1 = arg min
   0
˛ ˛{e   M : e is   heavy}
˛ ˛,
with h
  being the common congestion.
Now, let  
2    
1 be the subset of  
1 consisting of all
those proﬁles with maximum congestion on the resources.
That is,
 
2 = arg max
   1 h
  .
Let UN( ) =
P
i N Ui( ) denotes the group utility of the
agents, and let  
3    
2 be the subset of all proﬁles in  
2
with maximum group utility. That is,
 
3 = arg max
   2
X
i N
Ui( ) = arg max
   2 UN( ).
Consider ﬁrst the simple case in which max   1 h
  = 0.
Obviously, in this case,  
1 =  
2 =  
3 = {x = ( ,..., )}.
We show below that by performing a ﬁnite series of (one-
step) addition operations on x, we obtain an even, DS-
stable strategy proﬁle y with higher congestion, that is with
h
y > h
x = 0, in contradiction to x    
2. Let z    
0 be
a nearly-even (not necessarily even) DS-stable proﬁle such
that mine M h
z
e = 0, and note that the proﬁle x satisﬁes
the above conditions. Let N(z) be the subset of agents for
which a proﬁtable A-move exists, and let i   N(z). Obvi-
ously, there exists a z-light resource a such that Ui(z i,zi  
{a}) > Ui(z) (otherwise, argmine M h
z
e   zi, in contra-
diction to mine M h
z
e = 0). Consider the strategy proﬁle
z
  = (z i,zi  {a}) which is obtained from z by a (one-step)
addition of resource a by agent i. Since z is nearly-even and
a is z-light, we can easily see that z
  is nearly-even. Then,
Lemma 7 implies that z
  is S-stable. Since i is the only agent
using resource a in z
 , by Lemma 8, no proﬁtable D-moves
are available. Thus, z
  is a DS-stable strategy proﬁle. There-
fore, since the number of resources is ﬁnite, there is a ﬁnite
series of one-step addition operations on x = ( ,..., ) that
leads to strategy proﬁle y    
1 with h
y = 1 > 0 = h
x, in
contradiction to x    
2.
We turn now to consider the other case where max   1 h
 
  1. In this case we select from  
3 a strategy proﬁle x,
as described below, and use it to contradict our contrary
assumption. Speciﬁcally, we show that there exists x    
3
such that for all j   N,
vjf(h
x)
|xj| 1  
c(h
x + 1)
1   f(hx + 1)
. (1)
Let x
  be a strategy proﬁle which is obtained from x by
a (one-step) addition of some resource a   M by some
agent i   N(x) (note that x
  is nearly-even). Then, (1)
is derived from and essentially equivalent to the inequality
Uj(x
 )   Uj(x
 
 j,x
 
j   {a}), for all a   xj. That is, after
performing an A-move with a by i, there is no proﬁtable
D-move with a. Then, by Lemmas 7 and 8, x
  is DS-stable.
Following the same lines as above, we construct a procedure
that initializes at x and achieves a strategy proﬁle y    
1
with h
y > h
x, in contradiction to x    
2.
Now, let us conﬁrm the existence of x    
3 that sat-
isﬁes (1). Let x    
3 and let M(x) be the subset of all
resources for which there exists a proﬁtable (one-step) ad-
dition. First, we show that (1) holds for all j   N such that
xj  M(x)  =  , that is, for all those agents with one of their
resources being desired by another agent.
Let a   M(x), and let x
  be the strategy proﬁle that is
obtained from x by the (one-step) addition of a by agent i.
Assume on the contrary that there is an agent j with a   xj
such that
vjf(h
x)
|xj| 1 <
c(h
x + 1)
1   f(hx + 1)
.
Let x
   = (x
 
 j,x
 
j   {a}). Below we demonstrate that x
  
is a DS-stable strategy proﬁle and, since x
   and x corre-
spond to the same congestion vector, we conclude that x
  
lies in  
2. In addition, we show that UN(x
  ) > UN(x), con-
tradicting the fact that x    
3.
To show that x
      
0 we note that x
   is an even strategy
proﬁle, and thus no S-moves may be performed for x
  . In
addition, since h
x  
= h
x and x    
0, there are no proﬁtable
D-moves for any agent k  = i,j. It remains to show that
there are no proﬁtable D-moves for agents i and j as well.Since Ui(x
 ) > Ui(x), we get
vif(h
x)
|xi| >
c(h
x + 1)
1   f(hx + 1)
  vif(h
x  
)
|x  
i | 1 = vif(h
x)
|xi| >
c(h
x + 1)
1   f(hx + 1)
>
c(h
x)
1   f(hx)
=
c(h
x  
)
1   f(hx  )
,
which implies Ui(x
  ) > Ui(x
  
 i,x
  
i   {b}), for all b   x
  
i .
Thus, there are no proﬁtable D-moves for agent i. By the
DS-stability of x, for agent j and for all b   xj, we have
Uj(x)   Uj(x j,xj   {b})   vjf(h
x)
|xj| 1  
c(h
x)
1   f(hx)
.
Then,
vjf(h
x  
)
|x  
j | 1 > vjf(h
x  
)
|x  
j |
= vjf(h
x)
|xj| 1  
c(h
x)
1   f(hx)
=
c(h
x  
)
1   f(hx  )
  Uj(x
  ) > Uj(x
  
 j,x
  
j   {b}), for all b   xi. Therefore, x
  
is DS-stable and lies in  
2.
To show that UN(x
  ), the group utility of x
  , satisﬁes
UN(x
  ) > UN(x), we note that h
x  
= h
x, and thus Uk(x
  ) =
Uk(x), for all k   N   {i,j}. Therefore, we have to show
that Ui(x
  ) + Uj(x
  ) > Ui(x) + Uj(x), or Ui(x
  )   Ui(x) >
Uj(x)   Uj(x
  ). Observe that
Ui(x
 ) > Ui(x)   vif(h
x)
|xi| >
c(h
x + 1)
1   f(hx + 1)
and
Uj(x
 ) < Uj(x
  )   vjf(h
x)
|xj| 1 <
c(h
x + 1)
1   f(hx + 1)
,
which yields
vif(h
x)
|xi| > vjf(h
x)
|xj| 1 .
Thus, Ui(x
  )   Ui(x)
=
“
1   f(h
x)
|xi|+1
”
vi   (|xi| + 1)c(h
x)
 
h“
1   f(h
x)
|xi|
”
vi   |xi|c(h
x)
i
= vif(h
x)
|xi| (1   f(h
x))   c(h
x)
> vjf(h
x)
|xj| 1 (1   f(h
x))   c(h
x)
=
“
1   f(h
x)
|xj|
”
vj   |xj|c(h
x)
 
h“
1   f(h
x)
|xj| 1
”
vj   (|xi|   1)c(h
x)
i
= Uj(x)   Uj(x
  ).
Therefore, x
   lies in  
2 and satisﬁes UN(x
  ) > UN(x), in
contradiction to x    
3.
Hence, if x    
3 then (1) holds for all j   N such that
xj  M(x)  =  . Now let us see that there exists x    
3 such
that (1) holds for all the agents. For that, choose an agent
i   argmink N vif(h
x)
|xk|. If there exists a   xi   M(x)
then i satisﬁes (1), implying by the choice of agent i, that
the above obviously yields the correctness of (1) for any
agent k   N. Otherwise, if no resource in xi lies in M(x),
then let a   xi and a
    M(x). Since a   xi, a
  /   xi,
and h
x
a = h
x
a , then there exists agent j such that a
    xj
and a /   xj. One can easily check that the strategy pro-
ﬁle x
  =
`
x {i,j},(xi   {a})   {a
 },(xj   {a
 })   {a}
´
lies
in  
3. Thus, x
  satisﬁes (1) for agent i, and therefore, for
any agent k   N.
Now, let x    
3 satisfy (1). We show below that by
performing a ﬁnite series of one- and two-step addition op-
erations on x, we can achieve a strategy proﬁle y that lies
in  
1, such that h
y > h
x, in contradiction to x    
2. Let
z    
0 be a nearly-even (not necessarily even), DS-stable
strategy proﬁle, such that
vi
Y
e zi {b}
f(h
z
e)  
c(h
z
b + 1)
1   f(hz
b + 1)
, (2)
for all i   N and for all z-light resource b   zi. We note that
for proﬁle x    
3    
1, with all resources being x-light,
conditions (2) and (1) are equivalent. Let z
  be obtained
from z by a one- or two-step addition of a z-light resource
a. Obviously, z
  is nearly-even. In addition, h
z 
e   h
z
e for
all e   M, and mine M h
z 
e   mine M h
z
e. To complete the
proof we need to show that z
  is DS-stable, and, in addition,
that if mine M h
z 
e = mine M h
z
e then z
  has property (2).
The DS-stability of z
  follows directly from Lemmas 7 and 8,
and from (2) with respect to z. It remains to prove property
(2) for z
  with mine M h
z 
e = mine M h
z
e. Using (2) with
respect to z, for any agent k with z
 
k = zk and for any z
 -
light resource b   z
 
k, we get
vk
Y
e z 
k {b}
f(h
z 
e )   vk
Y
e zk {b}
f(h
z
e)
 
c(h
z
b + 1)
1   f(hz
b + 1)
=
c(h
z 
b + 1)
1   f(hz 
b + 1)
,
as required. Now let us consider the rest of the agents.
Assume z is obtained by the one-step addition of a by agent
i. In this case, i is the only agent with z
 
i  = zi. The required
property for agent i follows directly from Ui(z
 ) > Ui(z). In
the case of a two-step addition, let z
  =
`
z {i,j},zi   {b},
(zj   {b})   {a}), where b is a z-heavy resource. For agent
i, from Ui(z i,zi   {b}) > Ui(z) we get
 
1  
Y
e zi
f(h
z
e)f(h
z
b + 1)
!
vi  
X
e zi
c(h
z
e)   c(h
z
b + 1)
>
 
1  
Y
e zi
f(h
z
e)
!
vi  
X
e zi
c(h
z
e)
  vi
Y
e zi
f(h
z
e) >
c(h
z
b + 1)
1   f(hz
b + 1)
, (3)
and note that since h
z
b   h
z 
e  for all e
    M and, in particu-
lar, for all z
 -light resources, then
c(h
z
b + 1)
1   f(hz
b + 1)
 
c(h
z 
e  + 1)
1   f(hz 
e  + 1)
, (4)
for any z
 -light resource e
 .Now, since h
z 
e   h
z
e for all e   M and b is z-heavy, then
vi
Y
e z 
i {e }
f(h
z 
e )   vi
Y
e z 
i {e }
f(h
z
e)
= vi
Y
e (zi {b}) {e }
f(h
z
e)   vi
Y
e zi
f(h
z
e),
for any z
 -light resource e
 . The above, coupled with (3)
and (4), yields the required. For agent j we just use (2)
with respect to z and the equality h
z
b = h
z 
a . For any z
 -light
resource e
 ,
vj
Y
e z 
j {e }
f(h
z 
e )   vi
Y
e z 
i {e }
f(h
z
e)
 
c(h
z
e  + 1)
1   f(hz
e  + 1)
=
c(h
z 
e  + 1)
1   f(hz 
e  + 1)
.
Thus, since the number of resources is ﬁnite, there is a ﬁnite
series of one- and two-step addition operations on x that
leads to strategy proﬁle y    
1 with h
y > h
x, in contradic-
tion to x    
2. This completes the proof.  
4. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we introduce and investigate congestion set-
tings with unreliable resources, in which the probability of a
resource’s failure depends on the congestion experienced by
this resource. We deﬁned a class of congestion games with
load-dependent failures (CGLFs), which generalizes the well-
known class of congestion games. We study the existence of
pure strategy Nash equilibria and potential functions in the
presented class of games. We show that these games do not,
in general, possess pure strategy equilibria. Nevertheless,
if the resource cost functions are nondecreasing then such
equilibria are guaranteed to exist, despite the non-existence
of a potential function.
The CGLF-model can be modiﬁed to the case where the
agents pay only for non-faulty resources they selected. Both
the model discussed in this paper and the modiﬁed one are
reasonable. In the full version we will show that the mod-
iﬁed model leads to similar results. In particular, we can
show the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for non-
decreasing CGLFs also in the modiﬁed model.
In future research we plan to consider various extensions
of CGLFs. In particular, we plan to consider CGLFs where
the resources may have di erent costs and failure probabil-
ities, as well as CGLFs in which the resource failure prob-
abilities are mutually dependent. In addition, it is of inter-
est to develop an e cient algorithm for the computation of
pure strategy Nash equilibrium, as well as discuss the social
(in)e ciency of the equilibria.
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